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34
Land managers, policymakers and other stakeholders make decisions about how ecosystems should be 35 managed. There are increasing calls that such decisions should be firmly rooted in robust evidence 36 (Sutherland et al., 2004; Segan et al., 2011; Baylis et al., 2016) . Reasons why current decisions may not be 37 evidence-based include decision makers' lack of access to evidence ) and inertia to 38 changing established practices (Sutherland et al., 2004) . However there are also clear limitations in the 39 available evidence on the likely impacts of potential conservation interventions in a given situation 40 (Ferraro & Pattanayak, 2006; Pattanayak, Wunder & Ferraro, 2010) . 41 before-and-after comparison of units exposed to the intervention is flawed, as some factor other than the 46 intervention may have caused the change in the outcome of interest (Ferraro & Hanauer, 2014; Baylis etal., 2016) . Comparing groups exposed and not exposed to the intervention is also flawed as the groups 48 may differ in other, potentially unobserved, ways that affect the outcome. 49
One solution is to replace simple post-project monitoring with more robust quasi-experiments, in which 50 a variety of approaches may be used to construct a counterfactual scenario statistically. Statistical 51 matching, including propensity score matching, involves comparing outcomes in units where an 52 intervention is implemented with outcomes in similar (statistically selected) units lacking the intervention. 53 This is increasingly used for conservation impact evaluations such as determining the effectiveness of a 54 sustainable agriculture program (Margoluis et al., 2001 ) and in investigating the impact of national park 55 establishment (Andam et al., 2008) or Community Forest Management (Rasolofoson et al., 2015) on 56 deforestation. Other quasi-experimental approaches include instrumental variables (where easily 57 observable variables correlated with the intervention but not the outcome are used as a proxy for the 58 treatment), the regression-discontinuity approach (which compares outcomes of interest in units just 59 above and below an initial eligibility criterion for implementation of the intervention:; as the criterion is 60 arbitrary, units on either side will be essentially identical other than in implementation of the 61 intervention), and difference-in-differences (which compares changes in outcomes in units exposed to an 62 intervention with changes in a comparison group which was not exposed). Butsic et al. (2017) provide 63 much more information on quasi-experiments' use in a conservation context. 64
Quasi-experiments should, and increasingly do, have a major role to play in conservation impact 65 evaluation, and in some situations will be the only robust option available to evaluators. Their use has 66 become substantially more common in recent years, which should be greatly welcomed, and meta-67 analyses of the effectiveness of certain interventions have recently begun to be published based upon 68 quasi-experimental analyses (Samii et al., 2014 ; also see Börner et al., 2016 Börner et al., , 2017 allocating from the population of interest those units (individuals, areas or communities) which will 76 receive a particular intervention (the 'treatment group'), and those which will not (the 'control group'), 77 there should be no substantial differences in the types of unit that are in the treatment group when 78 compared with the control group (e.g. White 2013 ). Evaluators can therefore assume that in the absence 79 of the intervention, the outcomes of interest would have changed in the same way in the two groups 80 making the control group a valid counterfactual for measuring the effect of the intervention can be 81 calculated. Complete balance in all characteristics between treatment and control groups can only be 82 guaranteed with extremely large sample sizes (e.g. Bloom 2008 ). However baseline data collection, 83 stratification, and checking for balance between treatment and control groups can greatly reduce the 84 probability of unbalanced groups (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013 ) and if differences remain this can be 85 resolved through its inclusion as a covariate in subsequent analyses (Senn 2013) . In any program, there 86 may be a difference between the units which were potentially exposed to the intervention (all units in the 87 treatment group) and those actually exposed (a sub-set of the intervention group). This arises because 88 many interventions are voluntary and take-up will not be 100%, or units may fail to comply or drop out 89 for many reasons. Evaluators therefore often calculate both the mean effect on units in the intervention 90 group as a whole (the 'intention to treat') and the effect of the actual intervention on a treated unit (the 91 'treatment on the treated', e.g. Glennerster & Takavarasha 2013) . 92
The relative simplicity and intuitiveness of RCTs may make them particularly appealing to policymakers, 93 especially when compared with the statistical 'black box' of quasi-experiments, and this may make them 94 more persuasive than other impact evaluation methods to sceptical audiences (Banerjee, Chassang & 95 Snowberg, 2016) . While the different kinds of quasi-experiment have associated with each of them a large 96 number of assumptions in order for the counterfactual to be valid, and indeed the validity of the effect 97 size estimate for any such quasi-experiment may be dependent upon the extent to which those 98 assumptions are met, experimental evaluations such as RCTs avoid many of these problems and thus in 99 some ways are conceptually simpler than quasi-experiments (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013) . RCTs are 100 also substantially less dependent on any theoretical understanding of how the intervention might or might 101 not work. 102
RCTs are central to the paradigm of evidence-based medicine: since the 1940s tens of thousands of RCTs 103 have been conducted and they are often considered the 'gold standard' for testing treatments' efficacy 104 (Barton, 2000) . They are also widely used in agriculture, education, social policy (Bloom, 2008) payments for ecosystem services, and certification schemes). We term these socio-ecological 125
interventions. There are clear lessons to be learnt from RCTs in development economics, which also aim 126 to achieve development outcomes through changing human behaviour and therefore face similar issues. We expect that RCT evaluation in conservation will become more widespread in the coming years. 132
We examine the potential of RCTs in developing the evidence base supporting (or otherwise) use of 133 conservation interventions and thereby supporting evidence-informed decision making. We discuss the 134 factors influencing the usefulness, feasibility, and quality of RCT evaluation of conservation and aim to 135 provide insights for researchers and practitioners interested in conducting high-quality evaluations. The 136 structure of the chapter is mirrored by a checklist (figure 1) which can be used to assess the feasibility of 137 an RCT in a given context. We also illustrate these points throughout the chapter with the implementation 138 to RCTs (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013) . 172
Solutions to the external validity problem include conducting qualitative studies alongside an RCT 173 (researchers will inevitably develop an understanding of the causal processes involved anyway), or using 174 covariates to explore which factors influence outcome. The most obvious solution, however, is to conduct 175
RCTs of the same kind of intervention in different socio-ecological contexts (White, 2013) What affects the feasibility of RCT evaluation?
210
Ethical challenges 211
Randomisation involves withholding the intervention from the control group so the decision to randomize 212 is not a morally neutral one. A central ethical principle in medical RCTs is that to justify a randomised 213 experiment, there must be significant uncertainty surrounding whether the treatment is in fact better 214 than the control (a principle known as equipoise). The mechanisms through which an environmental 215 intervention is intended to result in changes are often complex and poorly understood, meaning that in 216 environmental RCTs there may indeed be uncertainty about whether the treatment is better than the 217 control. Additionally, it is unclear whether obtaining equipoise should even always be an obligation for 218 evaluators (e.g. Brody 2012), as how well -not just whether -an intervention works, and how cost-219 effective it is, are also important results for policymakers. It may be argued that lack of availability of high-220 quality evidence leading to resources being wasted on ineffective or only modestly effective interventions 221 is also unethical (List & Rasul, 2011) . Decisions such as these are not solely for researchers to make and 222 must be handled with sensitivity (White, 2013) . 
Spatial and temporal scale 238
Larger numbers of randomisation units in an RCT allow reliable detection of smaller effect sizes (Bloom, 239 2008). This is easily achievable in small-scale experiments, such as those studying the effects of nest boxes 240 on bird abundance or of wildflower verges on farmland invertebrate biodiversity; such trials have been a 241 mainstay of applied ecology for decades (c.f. Fisher 1935). However, increases in scale of the intervention 242 will make RCT implementation more challenging. A large randomisation unit (such as a protected area) 243 will mean few available randomisation units, increasing the effect size required for a result to be 244 statistically significant and decreasing the experiment's power (Bloom, Evaluators must decide upon the unit at which allocation of the intervention is to occur. In medicine the 285 unit is normally the individual, although some interventions may be allocated to groups. In development 286 economics units may be individuals, households, schools, communities, or other groups while in 287 conservation units could also potentially include fields, farms, habitat patches, protected areas, or others. 288
Units selected should, however, logically correspond to the process of change by which the intervention 289 is understood to lead to the desired outcome (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013) . 290
In conservation RCTs, surrounding context will often be critical to interventions' functioning. This is also 291 true of some RCTs in medicine or development economics, and hence evaluators can learn from these 292 fields. Spatial context means that evaluators need to consider the potential for outcomes to 'spill over' 293 between units -with positive effects from the intervention in treatment units affecting control units, or 294 vice versa (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013; Baylis et al., 2016) . It is easy to imagine species of interest 295 moving from one unit to another because of habitat connectivity or water flowing down from a treatment 296 area to a control one. These kinds of spillover, which we refer to as biophysical as they relate to ecological 297 processes, thus cause changes achieved in treatment areas to affect outcomes of interest in control areas 298 and thus reduce an intervention's apparent effect size. If an intervention were to be implemented in all 299 areas rather than solely treatment areas (presumably the ultimate goal for practitioners), such effects 300 would not occur. Spillover is particularly likely to occur if the randomisation unit and the natural unit of 301 the intended ecological process of change do not align, meaning in practice the intervention would be 302 implemented in areas which would affect outcomes at control sites, and vice versa. 303
Spillover effects are thus a property of the trial itself, and are recognized as important in some situations 304 in development economics. For example, the influential RCT investigating treatment of worm infection in 305
Kenyan schoolchildren used schools as the randomisation unit as children in the same school are likely to 306 interact and re-infect each other more frequently than with children at other schools. It was explicitly 307 designed to allow measurement of spillover (Miguel & Kremer, 2004) ; and showed (notwithstanding the 308 re-analysis by Davey et al. [2015] ) that deworming in treatment schools resulted in decreased worm 309 burden in children attending nearby non-treatment schools. Such spillover also affected one of the very 310 few attempts to conduct a large-scale environmental management RCT: the UK Government's RCT of 311 badger culling in south-western England (Donnelly et al., 2005) . 312
Preliminary consideration of spatial relationships between units, and the relationship between 313 randomisation units and the process of change for the indicators, is critical for reducing or eliminating 314 spillover and thus successfully undertaking internally valid conservation RCTs. Spillover may also be 315 reduced by selecting indicators and/or sites to monitor which would still be relevant and meaningful but 316 would be unlikely to suffer from spillover (such as by choosing a species to monitor with a small range 317 size, or ensuring that a control area's monitoring site would not be directly downstream of a treatment 318 area's in an RCT of a payments for watershed services program). 319
In the evaluation of Watershared, it proved difficult to select a randomisation unit that was politically 320 feasible and worked for all outcomes of interest. Natura used the community as the randomisation unit 321 as it would have been extremely difficult to have offered Watershared agreements to some members of 322 communities and not to others. Community boundaries thus had to be drawn (these did not previously 323 exist) and these did not always align well with area of land in the catchment of the communities' water 324 sources. Thus while Natura did all it could to ensure that no community water quality monitoring site was 325 directly downstream of another, land under conservation agreements in one community would 326 sometimes be located in the catchment upstream of the monitoring site of another, risking biophysical 327 spillover. The extent to which this spillover took place, and its consequences, can be studied empirically. 328
Consequences of human behavioural effects on evaluation of socio-ecological interventions 329
There is a key difference between ecological interventions that aim to have a direct impact on an 330 ecosystem and socio-ecological interventions which seek to deliver ecosystem changes by changing 331 human behaviour. Medical RCTs are generally double-blinded so neither the researcher nor the 332 participants know who has been assigned to the treatment or control group. Double-blinding is possible 333 for some ecological interventions such as pesticide impacts on non-target invertebrate diversity in an 334 agroecosystem: implementers do not have to know whether they are applying the pesticide or a control. 335
This was partially achieved in the large-scale study of neonicotinoids cited above (Rundlöf et al., 2015) . 336
However, it is harder to carry out double-blind trials of the effects of socio-ecological interventions, as the 337 intervention's consequences can be observed by the researchers, and participants will know whether they 338 are being offered the intervention or not. concerned that members of control communities might decide to protect watercourses themselves after 346 seeing successful results elsewhere (which would be encouraging, suggesting local support for the 347 intervention, but which would interfere with the evaluation by reducing the effect size of the intervention 348 detected). They therefore included questions in their follow-up socio-economic surveys to identify this 349 effect; these revealed only one case in over 1500 household surveys. 350
The second issue with lack of blinding is that RCT design is intended to achieve that treatment and control some authors have claimed that these effects may be large (Bulte et al., 2014) . 357
Overlapping terms have been introduced into the literature to describe the ways in which actions of 358 participants in experiments vary due to differences in effort between treatment and control groups 359 (summarised in table 1). The 'Hawthorne effect' describes the phenomenon that participants in an 360 experiment may behave differently because they know that they are being studied (e.g. Levitt & List 2011) . 361
The 'Pygmalion' and 'golem' effects, in which participants may adjust effort to meet experimenter 362 expectations, are a form of this (Babad, Inbar & Rosenthal, 1982) . Similarly, treatment-group interviewees 363 may give answers that they believe evaluators wish to hear, known as experimenter demand. The related 364 'John Henry effect' may arise when individuals in control groups increase effort to compete with the 365 treatment group (Saretsky, 1972) . In addition, it is rational for subjects to increase effort expended on 366 implementing an intervention if they believe the intervention to be effective (Chassang, Padró i Miquel & 367 Snowberg, 2012). The consequence of these 'rational effort' effects can be that performance increases 368 when people believe in the intervention (Babad, Inbar & Rosenthal, 1982) . Therefore, if an intervention 369 appears to achieve a large change in an outcome of interest, that may be because true efficacy of the 370 intervention was large, or because participants believed it to be large and thus expended large amounts 371 of effort on implementing it. 372
We do not believe that potential behavioural effects invalidate RCT evaluation as some have claimed 373 (Scriven, 2008) , as part of an intervention's impact in subsequent implementation will also be due to 374 implementers' expended effort (Chassang, Padró i Miquel & Snowberg, 2012). It remains unclear whether 375 behavioural effects are large enough to result in incorrect inference, or even exist at all (Bausell, 2015) . In 376 the case of the evaluation of Watershared, compliance monitoring is an integral part of incentive-based 377 or conditional conservation, so any behavioural effect driven by increased monitoring should be thought 378 of as an effect of the intervention itself rather than a confounding influence on outcome. Any such effects 379 may be reduced through low-impact monitoring (Glennerster & Takavarasha, 2013) . In Bolivia, water 380 quality measurement was unobtrusive (few community members were aware of Natura technicians being 381 present) and infrequent (either annual or biennial); deforestation monitoring was even less obtrusive as 382 it was based upon satellite imagery; and socio-economic surveys were undertaken equally in treatment 383 and control communities. 384
Conclusions
385
Scientific evidence supporting an intervention's use does not necessarily lead to the uptake of that 386 intervention. Policy is at best evidence-informed rather than evidence-based (Adams & Sandbrook, 2013 ) 387 because cost and political acceptability inevitably influence decisions, and frameworks to integrate 388 evidence into decision-making are often lacking (Segan et al., 2011) . However, improving available 389 knowledge of intervention effectiveness is still important. For example, managers are more likely to report 390 an intention to change their management strategies when presented with high-quality evidence of 391 intervention effectiveness (Walsh, Dicks & Sutherland, 2015) . The potential for evidence to have influence 392 is higher when it is driven by the needs of practitioners: links between researchers and policymakers or 393 practitioners throughout the design and implementation of impact evaluation studies are therefore 394 valuable (Cook et al., 2013) . 395 effectiveness, and hence cost-effectiveness, and interest in their use is increasing within the conservation 397 community. Like any evaluation method, they are clearly not suitable in all circumstances, and there exist 398 significant practical challenges with their implementation. Even when feasible, evaluators must design 399
RCTs with great care to avoid spillover and behavioural effects and thus maintain internal validity. We 400 would argue that it still remains unclear whether, to what extent, and in which contexts, RCTs are likely 401 to provide estimates of treatment effects more accurate than quasi-experiments (c.f. Michalopoulos, 402
Bloom & Hill 2004; Bulte et al. 2014 ), due to confounding experimental effects. This research question 403 deserves a great deal more attention. There also will inevitably remain some level of subjectivity whether 404 a location or context for subsequent implementation of an intervention is similar enough to one where 405 an RCT was carried out to allow the learning to be confidently applied. We hope that those interested in 406 evaluating the impact of conservation interventions can avoid the polarization and controversy 407 surrounding their use in development economics while learning from their implementation in other fields. 408
RCTs may then make a substantial contribution towards building a more robust evidence base to underpin 409 conservation decisions. 410 Table 1 . Consequences of behavioural effects when compared with results obtained in a hypothetical double-blind RCT. Hawthorne '1', '2' and '3' 411 refer to the three kinds of effect discussed in Levitt & List (2011 
